In Praise of Reason

MIT Press (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-07-13

Downloads
64 (#243,546)

6 months
5 (#544,079)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references