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Psychological laws

William G. Lycan

Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38 (1981) Copy BIBT_EX

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William G. Lycan

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Categories

Anomalous Monism in Philosophy of Mind

Psychological Laws in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Keywords

Cognition Laws Propositional Attitudes Psychology Science Anderson, N Mcdowell, J

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02762080

DOI

10.5840/philtopics198112141

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Author's Profile

William G. Lycan

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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