Mental states and Putnam's functionalist hypothesis

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):48-62 (1974)
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William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Realization and the metaphysics of mind.Thomas W. Polger - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.
Armstrong's materialism.George S. Pappas - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (September):569-592.
Naturalizing intentions.R. J. Nelson - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):173 - 203.

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References found in this work

A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
Comments.Alvin Plantinga - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (20):585-587.

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