Enactive intentionality

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12 (2006)
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Abstract

Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities

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William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Olfactory imagery: is exactly what it smells like.Benjamin D. Young - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3303-3327.
Perceptual presence.Jason Leddington - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.
Egocentric Space.Joel Smith - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):409-433.

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