M.A. Thesis - Hume on the Nature of Moral Freedom

Dissertation, Georgia State University (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Paul Russell argues that the interpretation of Hume as a classical compatibilist is misguided. Russell defends a naturalistic reading of Humean freedom and moral responsibility. On this account, Hume holds two theses: that moral responsibility is a product of our moral sentiments, and that our concept of moral freedom is derived from our considerations of moral responsibility. Russell claims that Hume’s theory of the passions is non-cognitivist, and thus that his account of moral judgment fails to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions or qualities of mind. He concludes that Hume’s account of moral responsibility is inadequate. I argue that Hume has a cognitivist account of the passions. For Hume, our character is judged to be a proper object of praise or censure on account of our ability to partake in a moral community with our fellows. I conclude that Hume does not naturalize freedom and moral responsibility, but socializes it.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,898

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Freedom and Moral Sentiment. [REVIEW]Nathan Brett - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (3):659-661.
Hume on free will.Paul Russell - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is Hume's Ideal Moral Judge a Woman?Getty L. Lustila - 2017 - Hume Studies 43 (2):79-102.
Does Reid Have Anything to Say to Hume?Terence Cuneo - 2015 - In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value. Oxford University Press.
David Hume: Moral Philosophy.Ryan Pollock - 2019 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


Added to PP

5 (#1,194,130)

6 months
1 (#479,521)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Getty Lustila
Northeastern University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
The identity approach to the mind-body problem.Wilfrid Sellars - 1965 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (3):430-51.

Add more references