Robert Lurz
Brooklyn College
David Rosenthal and Fred Dretske agree that creature consciousness should be used to give a reductive explanation of state consciousness. They disagree, however, over what type of creature consciousness will do the job. Rosenthal, defending a higher-order thought account, argues that higher-order creature consciousness is what is needed. Dretske, defending a first-order account, argues that first-order creature consciousness is what is needed. I attempt to advance this debate by presenting a case for a third creature-conscious account of state consciousness. what I call the same-order account. I show that bydefining a conscious mental state as a mental state whose possessor is conscious of what it represents, we are offered a unique creature-conscious account of state consciousness that avoids some of the problems that have plagued both the HOT and FO accounts
Keywords Consciousness  Mental States  Metaphysics  Dretske, F  Rosenthal, D
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr20032826
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The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
Neither Hot nor Cold: An Alternative Account of Consciousness.Robert W. Lurz - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.

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