Interpretations of Probability and Bayesian Inference—an Overview

Acta Analytica 35 (1):129-146 (2020)
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Abstract

In this article, I first give a short outline of the different interpretations of the concept of probability that emerged in the twentieth century. In what follows, I give an overview of the main problems and problematic concepts from the philosophy of probability and show how they relate to Bayesian inference. In this overview, I emphasise that the understanding of the main concepts related to different interpretations of probability influences the understanding and status of Bayesian inference. In the conclusion, I express that, from a broad epistemological point of view, a kind of compatibilism between the two main lines of interpretations of probability is worth pursuing, as they represent different aspects of the epistemological process.

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Peter Lukan
University of Ljubljana

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References found in this work

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
The Design Argument.Elliott Sober - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.

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