There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument

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MIT Press (2004)
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Abstract

The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.

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9780262621892   0262621894   0262122723
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Chapters

The knowledge argument can be introduced through a variety of differ-ent illustrations. Here are three.(i) Consider a complete physical theory of the light spectrum, including the effects different wavelengths of light have on the neural systems of humans. There are also the phenomenal properties we experience when we. [REVIEW]John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter
Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument.David J. Chalmers
about other people (because she learns something about them on her release). 3. There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist story. Regimenting further, for clarity's sake, yields the following. [REVIEW]Paul M. Churchland
10 Phenomenal Knowledge.Earl Conee
Inexpressible truths and the allure of the knowledge argument.Benj Hellie
20 Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson
Postscript on Qualia.Frank Jackson
Phenomenal States (Revised Version).Brian Loar
14 Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.Terence Morgan
12 What Mary Couldn't Know: Belief About Phenomenal States.Martine Nida-Riimelin
Motion blindness and the knowledge argument.Philip Pettit
Introduction.Daniel Stoljar
Introduction to There's Something About Mary.Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa
So many ways of saying no to Mary.Robert van Gulick

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Author Profiles

Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
Yujin Nagasawa
University of Oklahoma
Peter Ludlow

Citations of this work

There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119-150.
Kripke's knowledge argument against materialism.Adriana Renero - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):370-387.

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