Are Reference Rules Inessential to Meaning?

Metaphysics 3 (1):92-102 (2020)
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Abstract

This article responds to a case-based argument by Mark Richard that rule of reference is not essential to meaning. It objects that the argument requires shifting between understanding the relevant term in the case, ‘marriage,’ as a determinable, in order to support one premise, and a determinate, in order to support another. On no univocal interpretation can both premises be made true.

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Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

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References found in this work

Meanings as Species.Mark Richard - 2019 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Communication and shared information.Marija Jankovic - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):489-508.
Is Reference Essential to Meaning?Mark Richard - 2020 - Metaphysics 3 (1):68-80.

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