Philosophia 49 (1):359-372 (2021)

Authors
Jörg Löschke
University of Zürich
Abstract
The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is philosophically important, but there is no consensus on how to understand the distinction exactly. In this paper, I discuss several interpretations of the distinction that can be found in the literature: the Motivational Interpretation, the Scope Interpretation, and the Goal Interpretation, and argue that none of these interpretations is entirely convincing. I propose a novel interpretation of the distinction, which I call the Normative Force Interpretation, according to which the distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons concerns the normative force that these reasons can have for agents.
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-020-00218-1
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Blackwell.

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