Abstract

In liberal societies, we generally admit the principle of Procreative Liberty (PL) that, though usually defended with no explicit reference to Mill’s Harm Principle (HP), is perfectly coherent with it. It comprises several liberties, such as the liberty to decide when, how many times, with whom and if to procreate at all. On the other hand, we talk about the principle of Parental Autonomy (PA) or Parental Liberty: the parents have the right to raise their children and to make all decisions concerning them free from governmental intervention. Whatever the scope defended for this right, we usually admit that it has more limits than PL. The reason is clear enough: there is a third party involved, the child, and, according to Mill’s HP, the society can rightfully intervene. Though traditionally procreative and parental rights have been considered as independent rights, and though PL and PA have been defended on different basis, in this paper I want to argue that some proposed extensions of PL are best considered as cases of PA