Alfred Schutz on Social Order

Schutzian Research 6:27-45 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper aims to analyze the potentiality of Schutzian phenomenology to account for the problem of social order. Firstly, we expose the existence of an interpretive scheme of Parsonian roots in contemporary social theory that introduces the dualistic dilemma subjective action versus social order in the analysis of Schutz’s perspective. According to this interpretive scheme, Schutz fails to master the problem of social order. Secondly, and in clear opposition to those interpretations, we show three main contributions which have put forward the argument that it is possible to find in Schutz’s work a theory of social order: Harold Garfinkel’s early writings, the recent Austrian School of Economics’ reception of Schutz and the present-day interpretation in German sociology. In the context of these discussions, our reflections have explored the pragmatic dimension of the order of the life-world based on a phenomenonological constitutive analysis which provides a basis for a comprehensive theory of social order of Schutzian roots

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reflections on a Phenomenology of Power.Jochen Dreher - 2013 - Schutzian Research. A Yearbook of Worldly Phenomenology and Qualitative Social Science 5 (2013):103-119.
Unpacking “Institutional Racism”.Petrik Runst - 2010 - Schutzian Research 2:109-133.
Collected papers.Alfred Schutz - 1962 - Boston: Distributor for the U.S. and Canada Kluwer Boston. Edited by Maurice Alexander Natanson.
Subjectivity and Power.Jochen Dreher & Daniela Griselda López - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (2):197-222.
The phenomenology of Alfred Schutz.Maurice Natanson - 1966 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 9 (1-4):147 – 155.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-10-06

Downloads
22 (#692,982)

6 months
3 (#1,002,413)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references