VULNERABLE AND INVULNERABLE: two faces of dialectical reasoning

Angelaki 25 (1-2):135-140 (2020)
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Abstract

The last writings of Pamela Sue Anderson dwell in some depth on the facts of “mutual vulnerability” and “precarious life,” whether at a practical level or in philosophical argument. This topic can be considered in relation to the founding values of “philosophy” in the tradition we inherit from Plato. Although military imagery (immunity to attack etc.) is foregrounded in the Platonic conception of “dialectic” – that is, conversation or dialogue in a specialized sense, capable of leading to the stable possession of truth – we should also remember the more ordinary (imperfect, incomplete) prototype of conversation from which this idealized version emerges: conversation as exemplified by the sacrificial figure of Socrates, who claims not to know anything. The present paper suggests that there are these two sides to the classic dialectical encounter: aporia itself, along with the ambition to escape from aporia – to be no longer at a loss. But it also considers why, in that case, writers such as Anderson (or like Judith Butler) should still find so much potential in the theme of “precarity.” This question returns us to the institutional critique of philosophy: to a mismatch between (1) the moment of vulnerability inherent in the discipline a priori, and (2) the lived experience of vulnerability about which some practitioners of the subject – namely women and other disadvantaged groups – know so much more than others.

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