The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist Philosophers

Philo 13 (2):185-200 (2010)
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Abstract

That theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make the evidential case for theism to atheistic evidentialist philosophers raises a problem—a question to be answered. I argue here that—of the most plausible possible solutions to this problem—each is either inadequate or, when adequate, in conflict with the theistic evidentialist philosophers’ defining beliefs. I conclude that the problem of the theistic evidentialist philosophers—the question of why theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make their case to atheistic evidentialist philosophers—is a problem for theistic evidentialist philosophers—an objection to their defining beliefs.

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Author's Profile

Rob Lovering
College of Staten Island (CUNY)

Citations of this work

Most Peers Don’t Believe It, Hence It Is Probably False.René van Woudenberg & Hans van Eyghen - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):87-112.

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References found in this work

Can a Theory Answer more Questions than one of its Rivals?Adolf Grünbaum - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-23.

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