Res Philosophica 98 (2):261-281 (2021)

Authors
Kirk Lougheed
University of Pretoria
Abstract
Epistemic paternalism occurs when a decision is made for an agent which helps them arrive at the truth, though they didn’t consent to that decision. Common defenses of epistemic paternalism claim that it can help promote positive veritistic results. In other words, epistemic paternalism is often good for inquiry. I argue that there is often a better alternative available to epistemic paternalism in the form of what I call Open Group Inquiry. I then examine how Open Group Inquiry can be applied to cases of religious inquiry, while noting that epistemic paternalism is impermissible in cases of general religious inquiry. I argue that in the case of religious inquiry, there are serious questions about what constitutes evidence along with how to evaluate it. Rather than posing a particular worry for Open Group Inquiry, I suggest these questions pose a problem for religious inquiry in general. I conclude that while it very much matters how concepts like religious knowledge, religious faith, scepticism, etc., are defined, these considerations may well pave the way for a novel argument for religious scepticism.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
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DOI 10.11612/resphil.2041
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References found in this work BETA

Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1948 - Philosophy 23 (85):173-176.

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Citations of this work BETA

What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism?Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York: Routledge. pp. 132–150.

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