Sophia 53 (4):435-446 (2014)

Authors
Kirk Lougheed
University of Pretoria
Abstract
Either a ‘best world’ scenario is true or a ‘no best world’ scenario is true. In a ‘best world’ scenario, God actualizes a world that is unsurpassable. In a ‘no best world’ scenario, for any possible world God actualizes, God could have actualized a better world. A ‘no best world’ scenario precludes theism, so the theist should endorse a ‘best world’ scenario. However, a ‘best world’ scenario leads to the highly counter-intuitive conclusion of modal collapse: the position that nothing could have turned out differently than it did. A tentative solution to modal collapse is if the ‘best world’ scenario turns out to be the theistic multiverse containing many universes
Keywords Problem of no best world  Principle of sufficient reason  Theistic multiverse  Leibniz  William Rowe  Klaas J. Kraay  Myron A. Penner
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DOI 10.1007/s11841-014-0404-6
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References found in this work BETA

Can God Be Free?William L. Rowe - 2004 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 58 (3):201-203.
Principle of Sufficient Reason.Yitzhak Melamed & Martin Lin - unknown - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Theism and Modal Collapse.Klaas J. Kraay - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):361.
Theism and Modal Realism.Paul Sheehy - 2006 - Religious Studies 42 (3):315-328.

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Citations of this work BETA

Leibniz’s and Herder’s Philosophy of Optimism.Vasil Gluchman - 2021 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 11 (1-2):37-47.

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