Have Elephant Seals Refuted Aristotle? Nature, Function, and Moral Goodness

Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):353-375 (2012)
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Abstract

An influential strand of neo-Aristotelianism, represented by writers such as Philippa Foot, holds that moral virtue is a form of natural goodness in human beings, analogous to deep roots in oak trees or keen vision in hawks. Critics, however, have argued that such a view cannot get off the ground, because the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity is untenable in light of a Darwinian account of living things. This criticism has been developed most fully by William Fitzpatrick in his book Teleology and the Norms of Nature . In this paper, I defend the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity, focusing on Fitzpatrick's arguments. I argue that a natural goodness view is not impugned by an evolutionary account. Nor can neo-Aristotelian life form judgments be replaced by an evolutionary view of living things

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Micah Lott
Boston College

Citations of this work

Natural goodness without natural history.Parisa Moosavi - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:78-100.
Morality and Evolutionary Biology.William Fitzpatrick - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tusian Perfectionism.Reza Hadisi - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-23.
Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness.Ben Page - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3755-3775.

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References found in this work

Rationality and Goodness.Philippa Foot - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54:1-13.

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