The use of philosophical arguments in quantum physics

Philosophy of Science 31 (1):10-17 (1964)
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Two types of philosophical arguments are employed by the defenders and critics of the Copenhagen Interpretation. One type of argument is a confrontation of an opponent's interpretation with criteria of demarcation and criteria of acceptability. The purpose of such arguments is either to exclude an opponent's interpretation from the range of permissible discourse in quantum physics, or to establish the inadequacy of an opponent's interpretation. A second type of argument is a justification of the value, or utility, of the criteria selected



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Causality and Chance in Modern Physics.David Bohm - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):321-338.
Physics in My Generation.Max Born - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42):157-159.
Observation and Interpretation.Stephen Toulmin - 1959 - Philosophical Quarterly 9 (36):285-286.

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