Shoemaker and “Inner Sense”

Philosophical Topics 28 (2):147-170 (2000)
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Abstract

In the last of his three Royce Lectures called "Self‑Knowledge and 'Inner Sense'", Sydney Shoemaker attempts to reconcile two commitments: (1) that experiences have "qualia", nonrepresentational features that constitute what it is like to have the experiences, and (2) that perceptual experiences seem "diaphanous", yielding to introspection only the way they represent the environment, not intrinsic or otherwise nonrepresentational qualia. On the idea that we internally sense qualia�that we sense what our experiences are like�one way to explain apparent diaphanousness is to maintain that these qualia are mistakenly "projected" onto the environment, that in perception we erroneously sense qualia as belonging to environmental objects. Shoemaker rejects both the projection view and the existence of inner sense, and develops an alternative reconciliation. I will describe reasons to doubt his positive proposal, and ways to save projection and inner sense from his criticisms

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Eric Lormand
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Introspective misidentification.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1737-1758.

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