Impartiality, Eudaimonic Encroachment, and the Boundaries of Morality

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (forthcoming)
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Many hold that morality is essentially impartial. Many also hold that partiality is justified. Susan Wolf argues that these commitments push us towards downgrading morality's practical significance. Here I argue that there is a way of pushing morality's boundaries in a partialist direction in a way that respects Wolf's insights.



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Errol Lord
University of Pennsylvania

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