John Locke on Inference and Fallacy, A Re-Appraisal

Informal Logic 34 (4):364-392 (2014)
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Abstract

John Locke, long associated with the “standard” approach to fallacies and the “logical” approach to valid inference, had both logical and dialectical reasons for favoring certain proofs and denigrating others. While the logical approach to argumentation stands forth in Locke’s philosophical writings, a dialectical approach can be found in his contributions to public controversies regarding religion and toleration. Understanding Locke’s dialectical approach to argumentation not only makes his work more relevant to the contemporary discipline of informal logic, but this understanding also prompts a reconsideration of Locke’s rhetorical purpose. He approached argumentation dialectically because he wanted to appeal to a universal audience of free rational subjects, people not unlike the real historical audience whom Locke addressed: radical Whigs, latitudinarian Anglicans, early-Enlightenment philosophes.

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Citations of this work

Locke and “ad”.Richard Davies - 2023 - Argumentation 37 (3):473-492.

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References found in this work

Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:492-492.
A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy.Douglas Walton - 2003 - University Alabama Press.
Ad Hominem Arguments.Douglas Walton - 1998 - University Alabama Press.
Acts of Arguing, A Rhetorical Model of Argument (ARNO R. LODDER).C. W. Tindale - 1999 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 9 (1):73-78.

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