IV—Sharing Thoughts About Oneself

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):57-81 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper is about first‐person thoughts—thoughts about oneself that are expressible through uses of first‐person pronouns. It is widely held that first‐person thoughts cannot be shared. My aim is to postpone rejection of the more natural view that such thoughts about oneself can be shared. I sketch an account on which such thoughts can be shared and indicate some ways in which deciding the fate of the account will depend upon further work.

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Guy Longworth
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The You Turn.Naomi Eilan - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):265-278.
You and me.Guy Longworth - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):289-303.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
Plural predication.Thomas J. McKay - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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