Abstract

Incompatibilism is the claim that a human choice, in order to be free and responsible, must not be causally determined. The thesis of this dissertation is that Aristotle, along with several of his successors, accepts an account of human free choice that is both incompatibilist and philosophically attractive. ;Part One begins by setting out Aristotle's account of potentiality; this account, it is maintained, endorses determinism for non-human phenomena, but leaves open the possibility of indeterminism in the case of human action. It is then argued that in De Coelo I. 12 Aristotle commits himself to the claim that whatever is true is necessarily true, and that in De Interpretatione 9 he escapes the deterministic implications of this claim by denying that every meaningful prediction is either true or false. Moreover, in Metaphysics VI. 3 Aristotle endorses indeterministic causation in order to avoid universal necessitation. ;In Part Two, it is argued that in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle draws a distinction between voluntariness, which is extended to all animals, and what is "up to us," which is restricted to rational agents and is the ground of moral responsibility. While the former is compatible with determinism, the latter is not; and the indeterminacy of actions that are "up to us" is made possible by the disjunctive character of rational potentialities, which produce their effects through undetermined acts of selective attention. It will be seen that Aristotle's treatment of incontinence coheres well with this account. ;Finally, Part Three examines the development and defense of Aristotle's ideas by several post-Aristotelean philosophers. Diodorus Cronus, Epicurus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias endorse Aristotle's argument that whatever is true is necessarily true; and Epicurus and Alexander, like Aristotle, respond to this argument by denying truth or falsity of certain predictions. Epicurus and Alexander likewise reject determinism in order to make room for moral responsibility, and identify selective attention as the locus of indeterminism in human action; and Alexander distinguishes what is "up to us" from what is merely voluntary, and restricts indeterminism to rational agents