Why Naive Realism?

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-08-08

Downloads
1,941 (#4,963)

6 months
212 (#13,433)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Heather Logue
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
Austerity and Illusion.Craig French & Ian Phillips - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (15):1-19.
Recent Work on Naive Realism.James Genone - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1).
Rethinking naive realism.Ori Beck - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):607-633.

View all 75 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.William Fish - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

View all 31 references / Add more references