Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics

(ed.)
Cambridge: Blackwell (1991)
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1990

Call number

B945.F634.M4 1991

ISBN(s)

0631171037   9780631171034

DOI

10.2307/2220009

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Chapters

The nomic and the robust.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine
What narrow content is not.Ned Block
Naturalizing content.Paul Boghossian
Granny's campaign for safe science.Daniel C. Dennett
Why Fodor can't have it both ways.Michael Devitt
Can we explain intentionality?Brian Loar
Is there vindication through representationalism?Robert J. Matthews
Speaking up for Darwin.Ruth G. Millikan
Fodor and psychological explanation.John Perry & David J. Israel
Has content been naturalized?Lynne Rudder Baker
Does mentalese have a compositional semantics?Stephen R. Schiffer
Connectionism, constituency and the language of thought.Paul Smolensky
How to do semantics for the language of thought.Robert Stalnaker
Narrow content meets fat syntax.Stephen P. Stich

Similar books and articles

Speaking up for Darwin.Ruth G. Millikan - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 151-164.
A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - MIT Press.
Sticking up for oedipus: Fodor on intentional generalizations and broad content.Dennis Arjo - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45.
How to do semantics for the language of thought.Robert Stalnaker - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
What narrow content is not.Ned Block - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Why Fodor can't have it both ways.Michael Devitt - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 95--118.
Can we explain intentionality?Brian Loar - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Naturalizing content.Paul Boghossian - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
What Fodor means: Some thoughts on reading Jerry Fodor's A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Kenneth Livingston - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):289-301.
Fodor and psychological explanation.John Perry & David J. Israel - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.

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Author's Profile

Barry Loewer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.
Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
How to acquire a concept.Eric Margolis - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):347-369.

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