Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):193-208 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,442

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral explanations of moral beliefs.Don Loeb - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):193–208.
A Unificationist Vindication of Moral Explanation.Lei Zhong - 2011 - Philosophical Forum 42 (2):131-146.
A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations.Joseph Millum - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):385-407.
Moral Facts and Best Explanations.Brian Leiter - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):79.
A Critique of Assimilative Moral Realism.Ken Yasenchuk - 1995 - Dissertation, Mcmaster University (Canada)
Moral and theological realism: The explanatory argument.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329.
Expressivist Explanations.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):147-177.
Do Moral Explanations Matter?Charles Sayward - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem.Jussi Suikkanen - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 168-194.
Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-597.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-16

Downloads
14 (#733,752)

6 months
4 (#185,521)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Don Loeb
University of Vermont

Citations of this work

Theism and Explanationist Defenses of Moral Realism.Andrew Brenner - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (4):447-463.
Making Sense of Explanatory Objections to Moral Realism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):37-50.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references