Generality and moral justification

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):79-96 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Demands for generality sometimes exert a powerful influence on our thinking, pressing us to treat more general moral positions, such as consequentialism, as superior to more specific ones, like those which incorporate agent-centered restrictions or prerogatives. I articulate both foundationalist and coherentist versions of the demands for generality and argue that we can best understand these demands in terms of a certain underlying metaphysical commitment. I consider and reject various arguments which might be offered in support of this commitment, and argue that generality may not be the weapon in moral argument that it is sometimes thought to be



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,726

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Generality and Moral Justification.Don Loeb - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):79-96.
Generality in Moral Reflection.Don Loeb - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
On General and Non‐General Abilities.Simon Kittle - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):124-144.
Moral Commitment and Moral Theory.Sarah Stroud - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:381-398.
Responsibility and the Demands of Morality.Stephen J. White - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (3):315-338.
Unlimited Possibilities.Gonçalo Santos - 2011 - In Michal Peliš & Vít Punčochář (eds.), The Logica Yearbook. College Publications.
Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws.Jim Hutchinson - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy (2):1-18.
The Demands of Necessity.David James Clark - 2023 - Ethics 133 (4):473-496.
A Diagnosis and Resolution to the Generality Problem.Klemens Kappel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):525-560.


Added to PP

140 (#134,672)

6 months
45 (#106,846)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Don Loeb
University of Vermont

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references