Full-Information Theories of Individual Good

Social Theory and Practice 21 (1):1-30 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper is a criticism of full-information theories of welfare. Such theories unsuccessfully attempt to accommodate an internalist intuition (that one's good depends in some way on one's desires or hypothetical desire) with a rationalist intuition (that only fully-informed desires are relevant to one's good).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Well-Being and the Priority of Values.Jason Raibley - 2010 - Social Theory and Practice 36 (4):593-620.
Present Desire Satisfaction and Past Well-Being.Donald W. Bruckner - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):15 - 29.
Attraction, Description and the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Welfare.Eden Lin - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-8.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (47):1288-1321.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Spinoza's theories of value.Andrew Youpa - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2):209 – 229.
Self-interest and the Concept of Self-sacrifice.Mark Carl Overvold - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):105-118.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
131 (#140,866)

6 months
26 (#139,398)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Don Loeb
University of Vermont

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references