Abstract

Slippery slope arguments are used in a wide variety of social policy debates. Generally speaking, such arguments hold that we should resist some practice or policy, either on the grounds that our accepting it would be likely to lead us to accept some other practice or policy that is clearly morally objectionable, or on the grounds that since there is no rationally defensible line that we can draw between the former and the latter, there is no rational basis for accepting the one and rejecting the other. Although proponents of slippery slope arguments often advance them as fundamental reasons for resisting some practice or policy, philosophers tend to dismiss such arguments rather quickly. ;Using examples of slippery slope arguments that people have invoked in debates concerning abortion, euthanasia, human gene therapy, and free speech, I argue that slippery slope arguments are worthy of more attention than philosophers often give them. Although some slippery slope arguments are bad arguments, others are better. Indeed, some slippery slope arguments provide us with compelling reasons for resisting various practices or policies. I argue that we can therefore make no sweeping generalizations regarding the strength of slippery slope arguments as a class, and that such arguments are valuable in ways that people often do not notice. When properly understood, slippery slope arguments can play extremely important roles in social policy debates