DiaLaw. On legal justification and dialogical models of argumentation

Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1999)
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Abstract

In this work it is argued that legal justification can best be studied from a procedural, dialogical point of view: legal statements are justified if the audience is convinced in an argumentative dialog. The formalized and implemented model DiaLaw guards the procedure in which two players aim at justifying statements. DiaLaw shows the advances and problems linked to procedural models of legal justification. Moreover, an instructive discussion of the different models of procedural justification is provided. It is stressed that in legal justification not only logically compelling arguments should be considered, but also convincing arguments. Therefore DiaLaw also deals with the rhetorical, psychological aspects of argument. This book is relevant for scholars in legal theory, artificial intelligence, and argumentation, and can be used in graduate courses on AI and Law, and legal argumentation.

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References found in this work

The concept of law.Hla Hart - 1961 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
Speech Acts.J. Searle - 1969 - Foundations of Language 11 (3):433-446.
The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Philosophy 34 (130):244-245.

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