Reference and propositional attitudes

Philosophical Review 81 (1):43-62 (1972)
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Abstract

Frege and quine notwithstanding, Some singular terms in belief contexts have normal reference but do not admit truth-Preserving substitution of co-Referential terms. The conditions of a sentence's being true of a sequence of referents may be partially determined by its singular terms; substitution may change those conditions, While preserving genuine reference. On one reading, 'n believes that f is g' is true iff n believes of the f that it is the f and is g

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Citations of this work

Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Presupposition.David I. Beaver - 1997 - In Johan van Bentham & Alice ter Meulen (eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language. MIT Press.
Replies to the papers in the issue "Recanati on Mental Files".François Recanati - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):408-437.
Accidental sameness in Aristotle.Frank A. Lewis - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (1):1 - 36.

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