Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content

In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 229--258 (2003)
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Citations of this work

The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
Why Mary Left Her Room.Michaela M. McSweeney - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.
Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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