Humanitas Hodie 2 (2):h223 (2019)

J. R. Loaiza
Universidad Del Rosario
In the xvii century, William Molyneux asked John Locke whether a newly-sighted person could reliably identify a cube from a sphere without aid from their touch. While this might seem an easily testable question, answering it is not so straightforward. In this paper, I illustrate this question and claim that some distinctions regarding the concept of consciousness are important for an empirical solution. First, I will describe Molyneux’s question as it was proposed by Molyneux himself, and I’ll briefly say something about its early debates. Second, I will go over some empirical attempts to solve this question, including recent experiments coming from neuroscience. Third, I will introduce some distinctions with regards to consciousness, and in the following section I will apply them to the Molyneux case. Finally, I will shortly consider some consequences of this approach. I conclude by suggesting researchers pay attention to different senses in which Molyneux’s question might be posed for empirical purposes.
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DOI 10.28970/hh.2019.2.a3
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What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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