Leaping to conclusions: Connectionism, consciousness, and the computational mind

In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 444--459 (1991)
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Dan Lloyd
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Citations of this work

The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Begging the question against phenomenal consciousness.Ned Block - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):205-206.
A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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