Instability, modus ponens and uncertainty of deduction

Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):658-674 (2006)
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Abstract

Considering the instability of nonlinear dynamics, the deductive inference rule Modus ponens itself is not enough to guarantee the validity of reasoning sequences in the real physical world, and similar results cannot necessarily be obtained from similar causes. Some kind of stability hypothesis should be added in order to draw meaningful conclusions. Hence, the uncertainty of deductive inference appears to be like that of inductive inference, and the asymmetry between deduction and induction becomes unrecognizable such as to undermine the basis for the fundamental cleavage between analytic truth and synthetic truth, as W. V. O. Quine pointed out. Induction is not inferior to deduction from a pragmatic point of view

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Huajie Liu
Peking University

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References found in this work

Explaining Chaos.Peter Smith - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
An inquiry concerning human understanding: with a supplement, An abstract of A treatise of human nature.David Hume - 1955 - Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational. Edited by Charles William Hendel & David Hume.
Natural philosophy of cause and chance.Max Born (ed.) - 1949 - New York,: Dover Publications.
Readings in the philosophy of science.Herbert Feigl - 1953 - New York,: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Edited by May Brodbeck.

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