Explaining the Intuition of Revelation

Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):99-107 (2020)
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Abstract

This commentary focuses on explaining the intuition of revelation, an issue that Chalmers (2018) raises in his paper. I first sketch how the truth of revelation provides an explanation for the intuition of revelation, and then assess a physicalist proposal to explain the intuition that appeals to Derk Pereboom’s (2011, 2016, 2019) qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis.

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Michelle Liu
Monash University

References found in this work

The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism.Derk Pereboom - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press.
Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.

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