The ranges of reasons and creasons

Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10 (2023)
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Abstract

In this discussion, we look at three potential problems that arise for Whiting’s account of normative reasons. The first has to do with the idea that objective reasons might have a modal dimension. The second and third concern the idea that there is some sort of direct connection between sets of reasons and the deliberative ought or the ought of rationality. We can see that we might be better served using credences about reasons (i.e., creasons) to characterise any ought that is distinct from the objective ought than possessed or apparent reasons.

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Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

A range of replies.Daniel Whiting - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (16).
Publisher Correction: Précis of The Range of Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-1.

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References found in this work

Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.
Knowledge and Legal Proof.Sarah Moss - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
Utilitarianism and Co-Operation.Donald Regan - 1980 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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