Whitehead's Theory of Prehensions

Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada) (1993)
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Abstract

Whitehead's theory of prehensions involves a protest against the bifurcation of nature into primary and secondary qualities where primary qualities are those independent of the observer's mind and secondary qualities are those added by the observer's mind. It was with the development of Newtonian physics that this view rose to popularity. Because of the overwhelming success of Newtonian physics, the insurmountable difficulties inherent in this world view were largely ignored by scientists, although pointed out clearly by Hume. With the rise of modern physics, it became clear that the fundamental notions of the materialistic world view were far too simple-minded. In Whitehead's organic world view the observer cannot be separated from the observed. The materialistic world view never lost its grip upon Einstein's mind and, in my thesis, the basis of Whitehead's criticisms of Einstein is seen to lie Einstein's unshakeable belief in a deterministic world that exists independently of observation

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