Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622 (2014)

Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
This paper offers a comparison of three different kinds of collective attitudes: aggregate, common, and corporate attitudes. They differ not only in their relationship to individual attitudes—e.g., whether they are “reducible” to individual attitudes—but also in the roles they play in relation to the collectives to which they are ascribed. The failure to distinguish them can lead to confusion, in informal talk as well as in the social sciences. So, the paper’s message is an appeal for disambiguation.
Keywords Collective intentionality  Aggregate, common, and corporate attitudes  Collective belief  Collective preference  Common belief and common knowledge  Group agency  Coordination
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9631-z
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Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.

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Neighborhood Semantics for Modal Logic.Eric Pacuit - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Social Ontology.Brian Epstein - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Group virtue epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Synthese 197 (12):5233-5251.

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