Perspectival Variance and Worldly Fragmentation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):42-57 (2016)
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Abstract

Objects often manifest themselves in incompatible ways across perspectives that are epistemically on a par. The standard response to such cases is to deny that the properties that things appear to have from different perspectives are properties that things really have out there. This type of response seems worrying: too many properties admit of perspectival variance and there are good theoretical reasons to think that such properties are genuinely instantiated. So, we have reason to explore views on which things can have the incompatible properties they appear to have across perspectives. This paper explores the view that things can have incompatible properties if the world is not a metaphysically unified place but is instead fragmented. There is a sensible notion of co-obtainment, on which two facts can each obtain without co-obtaining. Using this notion, we can step back from our embedded perspectives on the world without deeming the contents of those perspectives to be mere appearances. This renders th..

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Martin A. Lipman
Leiden University

Citations of this work

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Quantum relational indeterminacy.Claudio Calosi & Cristian Mariani - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 71 (C):158-169.
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