Demotivating Intentional Mentalism

Theoria 83 (4):298-318 (2017)
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Abstract

Intentional Mentalism is the view that mental intentionality is primary to non-mental intentionality and that the latter is derived from the former. In this article I examine three views which have been taken to motivate Intentional Mentalism: conventionalism as invoked by Searle, Gricean pragmatism, and the language of thought hypothesis. I argue that none of these views motivates Intentional Mentalism, and that, in fact, the former two imply its rejection.

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Author's Profile

Joachim Lipski
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München (PhD)

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References found in this work

Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Individualism and Psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.

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