Logical types in some arguments about knowability and belief

In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press (2009)
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Bernard Linsky
University of Alberta

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A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency.Eleonora Cresto - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.

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