Abstract

In his Second Treatise of Government, John Locke offers a theory of property. It is widely believed that his theory culminates in what has been called the consent argument, by which Locke justifies the genesis of contemporary inequality from an egalitarian state of nature. And it is believed that he also asserts here the so-called Lockean provisos, namely the fair share limit and the waste limit. However, it has been convincingly objected that Locke's consent argument does not work. This is perhaps the most serious charge facing Locke, since apparently the entire point of his economic philosophy is to justify contemporary inequality of holdings. ;In this dissertation, I shall defend Locke against this particular charge. Specifically, I shall argue that Locke in fact does not assert the consent argument nor does he intend to justify global inequality, as scholars have assumed. In the process, we shall have to renovate our current understanding of the Lockean provisos