Realismo cognitivo, naturalismo e pragmatismo ético: a estrutura normativa das “formas de vida” segundo Habermas e Putnam

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (3):459 (2013)
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The paper aims at recovering some epistemological issues in the debate between Putnam and Habermas about the objectivity of values. To begin with, I take up some discussions in philosophy of language and pragmatism in order to develop a framework according to which it is possible a less unilateral comprehension of the relation between naturalism and the normativity of ‘life forms’ (1). This account attempts to contextualize the Habermas /Putnam debate. Then I summarize Putnamt’s positions (2). Thirdly, after pointing out what appears to be the common argumentative position by delineating the boundaries of ethical pragmatism, the paper focuses on its meaning for contemporary issues in practical philosophy (3). Finally, I argue that Habermas is successful at responding to Putnam’s critics, although he thereby adheres in his account of deontological morality to an axiological orientation based on vulnerability (4).



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Erick Calheiros De Lima
Universidade de Brasília

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