Attenuating oneself

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-16 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, we address reports of “selfless” experiences from the perspective of active inference and predictive processing. Our argument builds upon grounding self-modelling in active inference as action planning and precision control within deep generative models – thus establishing a link between computational mechanisms and phenomenal selfhood. We propose that “selfless” experiences can be interpreted as cases in which normally congruent processes of computational and phenomenal self-modelling diverge in an otherwise conscious system. We discuss two potential mechanisms – within the Bayesian mechanics of active inference – that could lead to such a divergence by attenuating the experience of selfhood: “self-flattening” via reduction in the depth of active inference and “self-attenuation” via reduction of the expected precision of self-evidence.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,378

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Bayesian inference, predictive coding and delusions.Rick A. Adams, Harriet R. Brown & Karl J. Friston - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (3):51-88.
Bayesian Learning Models of Pain: A Call to Action.Abby Tabor & Christopher Burr - 2019 - Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 26:54-61.
Automated inference in active logics.Michael Miller & Donald Perlis - 1996 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 6 (1):9-27.
Into the dark room: a predictive processing account of major depressive disorder.Regina E. Fabry - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):685-704.
Hallucinations and perceptual inference.Karl J. Friston - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):764-766.
The Problem of Mental Action.Thomas Metzinger - 2017 - Philosophy and Predicitive Processing.
Beyond Inference in Perception.Stephen P. Stich - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982 (2):553-560.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-08-28

Downloads
28 (#482,738)

6 months
4 (#306,312)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Citations of this work

Minimal phenomenal experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
Dissolving the self.George Deane - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-27.
Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
The Self‐Evidencing Brain.Jakob Hohwy - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):259-285.

View all 34 references / Add more references