Philosophy 86 (2):175-200 (2011)

Authors
Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London
Abstract
Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substantially ethical one. I argue that this fact illuminates the epistemology of ethical intuitions
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819111000027
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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