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Testimony, Deference and Value
In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 458-468 (2021)
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Citations of this work
What's Wrong with Partisan Deference?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - In Worsnip Alex (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
How can we assess whether to trust collectives of scientists?Elinor Clark - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
References found in this work
Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework.David M. Estlund - 2008 - Princeton University Press.
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