In Defence of Radical Restrictionism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):3-25 (2019)
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Abstract

Restrictionism is a response to the Liar and other paradoxes concerning truth. Restrictionists—as I will call proponents of the strategy—respond to these paradoxes by giving up instances of the schema <p> is true iff p. My aim is to show that the current unpopularity of restrictionism is undeserved. I will argue that, whilst cautious versions of the strategy may face serious problems, a radical and previously overlooked version of restrictionism provides a strong and defensible response to the paradoxes.

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David Liggins
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

Nothing Is True.Will Gamester - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):314-338.
Irreplaceable truth.Jamin Asay - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-20.
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Truth as none and many.Will Gamester - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-25.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Realism, Mathematics, and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
Replacing truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
Logic for equivocators.David Lewis - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):431-441.

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