The Nature of Ideas

Review of Metaphysics 11 (2):181 - 195 (1957)
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Abstract

It has been argued, for example, that a psychic event is a thick substantial being. It is an image, a packet of feeling, or a silently said word. It is something bounded and wholly where it is. But then, thick enough to be a psychic event, an idea is too thick to be significant. It is a separate, separated thing that just is--and it does not point beyond itself to represent anything else in or out of consciousness.

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