Abstract

The concept of commitment occupies an important place in debates not only between realists and anti-realists in ethics, but also between communitarians and liberals in political philosophy, and is a topic of interest to action theorists, sociologists, and psychologists alike. One's commitment to certain principles, persons, or ideals, or one's solidarity to certain groups and communities, is widely thought to be an important part of our ordinary experience as individuals. The aim of the dissertation is to provide an analysis of commitment and the conditions under which it is possible, and in doing so to offer at the same time an indirect argument for moral realism--the view that moral judgments represent subject-independent facts. I argue that realist evaluative beliefs are functionally required for commitment, and since it is only within a realist framework that such beliefs make sense, realism about values is a condition for the possibility of commitment itself. Rather defending moral realism, as others have done, on epistemological, metaphysical, or linguistic grounds, I seek to show how one very important feature of our experience can only be explained and retained on the assumption of moral realism. Although it is still possible for others to reject realism in ethics, one cannot do so and retain commitment at the same time: the price one pays for being an anti-realist in ethics is the value we place on commitment. ;Commitments can be divided into two broad categories: the promissory and the standard, the second of which includes commitments to projects, like finishing a paper, as well as commitments to ideals and principles. The latter category is the focus of the dissertation, is divided into two subgroups: the intention-like and substantive commitments. By focusing on three central features of commitment--its stability over time, its action-guiding force, and its role in self-understanding and identity--and by using an action theoretic approach, I argue that realist evaluative beliefs are functionally required for commitment, especially for its role in self-understanding, and that the content of these beliefs concerns the objective merit of the commitment itself